In a single commodity setting with changing tastes, an individual's consumption plan can be obtained using naive or sophisticated choice. We provide two su¢ cient conditions for when (i) the solutions are unique and agree and (ii) the common plan is representable by a non-changing tastes utility. Because the solution is not revised over time, the plan and associated preferences are referred to as being e¤ectively consistent. Afriat-style revealed preference tests are derived. The assumption of e¤ective consistency can mitigate the problems of vulnerability to Dutch Books, non-existence of a competitive equilibrium and the aggregation of heterogeneous agents with changing tastes. JEL Codes: D01, D11, D50, D90.
predicting individuals'actions, 2 a number of diverse applications and theoretical extensions have appeared. 3 The changing tastes optimisation problem can most simply be framed in a three period certainty setting with a single consumption good c t (t = 1; 2; 3) in each period t. Assume preferences in period one are de…ned over (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) triples and represented by U (1) . Preferences in period two de…ned over (c 2 ; c 3 ) pairs, which can depend on c 1 , are represented by U (2) . For a …xed c 1 = c 1 , U (1) (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) and U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 jc 1 ) di¤er by more than a strictly increasing transform. To determine an optimal plan, an individual can follow naive choice by using U (1) to make the period one consumption decision and then in period two given remaining resources, use U (2) to make the allocation between c 2 and c 3 . Alternatively, she could follow sophisticated choice and solve the problem recursively using U (2) to make the allocation between c 2 and c 3 conditional on c 1 and then use U (1) to select c 1 .
In general, there is no reason to suppose that the resulting naive and sophisticated consumption plans should agree, and so the consumer confronts the problem of which process to follow. 4 However, as Pollak (1968) observed, there is no con ‡ict in the very special case where the changing tastes U (1) and U (2) both take the form of additively separable logarithmic utility (with arbitrary discounting). Although the consumer changes her plans with the passage of time, the naive and sophisticated plans always agree. Donaldson and Selden (1981) showed that for these preferences, the common consumption plan can be rationalised by a non-changing tastes utility b U . We refer to this common plan as being e¤ectively consistent, since when obtained by maximising b U , rather than U
(1) and U (2) , the plan will not be revised over time. This result seems to contradict the general view that there exists an intertemporal utility which rationalises sophisticated choice only if preferences take the strongly recursive form U (1) (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) = U c 1; U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 jc 1 ) .
5
In this paper we show that the existence of an e¤ectively consistent plan does not require preferences to be logarithmic, additively separable or homothetic. Two mutually exclusive su¢ cient conditions are given for when naive and sophisticated choice are 2 See, for example, Ainslie (1992) , Laibson (1997) and Frederick, et al. (2002) . Mulligan (1996) provides an interesting critique.
3 Examples of the former include Diamond and Koszegi (2003) and of the latter Luttmer and Mariotti (2006, 2007) . 4 Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Peleg and Yaari (1973) argue that one should think of the problem as being equivalent to a game between two divergent individuals, myself today and myself tomorrow. Harris and Laibson (2001) assume sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic consumers. Caplin and Leahy (2006) argue that the sophisticated approach is preferable to the game theoretic models. 5 See Remark 2 below.
unique and agree and the common plan can be rationalised by a non-changing tastes b U . Speci…c formulas are derived for constructing b U from the assumed changing tastes U (1) and U (2) . One of the su¢ cient conditions assumes that U (1) and U (2) take the myopic separable form introduced in Kannai, et al. (2014) . This form of utility implies that the consumer exhibits a strong form of two stage budgeting where the choice among commodities in a group is based on within group prices and income (the expenditure on the group becomes independent of prices of goods not in the group).
6 Concrete non-additive examples of e¤ectively consistent preferences are provided which are of particular interest due to the widely held aversion to assuming that intertemporal utility is additively separable. 7 The second su¢ cient condition requires the period utilities to take a quasilinear form. For our two forms of e¤ectively consistent preferences, we derive revealed preference tests in the spirit of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1983) such that observed demand-price pairs are consistent with maximising b U .
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We demonstrate that for a popular form of the quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility model of changing tastes, 10 the optimal consumption plan is e¤ectively consistent.
Although the resulting b U is an additively separable discounted utility, the discount function is neither quasi-hyperbolic nor exponential in form. b U is shown to discount the current period more heavily than the exponential case but not as strongly as the quasi-hyperbolic utility.
While the hypothesis that an individual's future tastes can be di¤erent from those currently assumed or perceived is both intuitively plausible and in some instances, such as the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility, consistent with behavioural data, it nevertheless can pose a number of challenging problems for standard economic analyses. We consider three di¤erent complications and show how the assumption of e¤ective consistency can mitigate these challenges. First given the changing tastes U
(1) and 6 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, ch.5 ) for a discussion of the weaker form of two stage budgeting considered by Strotz (1957 Strotz ( , 1959 and Gorman (1959) . 7 See Fisher (1930) , Hicks (1965) and Lucas and Stokey (1984) . 8 Since, as emphasised by Kubler (2004) and discussed in Section 4 below, only spot demands and prices (and incomes) are observed over time in the form of a single "extended" observation, our tests which require more observations would need to be performed in a laboratory setting such as in Choi, et al. (2007) . 9 One cannot determine whether a consumer's preferences correspond to U (1) and U (2) or b U based solely on observed consumption demands, since they are the same. However if the consumption optimisation problem is reformulated as a consumption-bond optimisation where there are both one and two period bonds, then it is possible to distinguish the consumer's naive consumption and bond purchases from those based on b U (see the online Appendix I). 10 See, for instance, Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) .
U
(2) , a consumer in general is vulnerable to a Dutch book or money pump sequence of trades. However if the consumer's preferences are e¤ectively consistent, then in a market setting she cannot be manipulated to impoverish herself. This result can be viewed as an alternative to the requirement in Laibson and Yariv (2007) that both U (1) and U (2) must be time separable. A second complication is that in the absence of transitive intertemporal preferences, Gabrieli and Ghosal (2013) have shown that a representative agent competitive equilibrium can fail to exist. Luttmer and Mariotti (2006, 2007) avoid this problem by assuming the intertemporal utilities U (1) and U
are both additively separable. Alternatively for the case where a representative agent b U exists, one can accommodate changing tastes without having to confront the possibility of the nonexistence of a competitive equilibrium.
11 Moreover given the existence of a b U , one can often signi…cantly simplify the characterisation of the equilibrium by using the …rst order conditions based on b U . Third in economies where tastes do not change, well-known conditions exist such that the aggregate demands for a collection of agents can be rationalised by a well-behaved utility function or aggregator.
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It is natural to ask whether the aggregate naive or sophisticated demands of consumers exhibiting changing tastes can be rationalised by an aggregator. We provide su¢ cient conditions such that e¤ectively consistent preferences of the individual agents can be aggregated for both the myopically separable and quasilinear cases. Moreover, we provide explicit formulas for constructing the aggregator from the changing tastes U
(1) and U (2) of the individual agents. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, notation and some preliminary de…nitions are given. Section 2 provides a motivating example. In Section 3, we derive two su¢ cient conditions for e¤ectively consistent plans. Section 4 gives a revealed preference test for the myopic separable utility associated with e¤ectively consistent preferences. Section 5 considers quasi-hyperbolic discounted utilities. In Section 6, we consider (i) the existence of Dutch Books or money pumps, (ii) naive and sophisticated equilibria and (iii) aggregation where consumers exhibit changing tastes. The last section contains concluding comments. Selected proofs are provided in the Appendix of this paper and the remaining proofs and supplemental materials are available in an online Appendix.
11 Herings and Rohde (2006) propose speci…c modi…cations of the classic general equilibrium and Pareto Optimality notions to accommodate changing tastes.
12 See the classic papers of Gorman (1953) and Chipman (1974) as well as the discussion of more contemporary work in Chipman (2006) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2011) .
Preliminaries: Changing Tastes
Assume a single consumption good, certainty setting in which a consumer is endowed with income or initial wealth of y 1 which she seeks to allocate over time periods t = 1; 2; 3. 13 Let c t and p t denote, respectively, consumption in period t and the present value price in period one of consumption in period t. Preferences for periods one and two are represented respectively by
where C t denotes the set of possible consumption values in period t, which is (a subset of) R + . Both U (1) and U (2) are assumed to satisfy the following property throughout this paper.
Property 1. The utility U is (i) a real-valued function de…ned on (a subset of) the positive orthant of a Euclidean space, (ii) C 2 , (iii) strictly increasing in each of its arguments and (iv) strictly quasiconcave.
At the heart of time inconsistency is the notion of changing tastes.
Definition 1. A consumer's tastes will be said to have changed if and only there exists a c 1 2 C 1 such that for every strictly increasing transformation T
It is clear from this de…nition that whether or not preferences change is the absence or presence of a very special nesting of U (2) in U (1) .
Proposition 1. (Blackorby, et al., 1973) Given preferences corresponding to U (1) (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) and U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 j c 1 ), the necessary and su¢ cient condition for tastes not to change in the sense of De…nition 1 is that for any given c 1 2 C 1 , there exists a strictly increasing transformation T such that
13 The assumption of three periods is made for simplicity. The general T period case is discussed in the online Appendix G. 14 Since U (2) can depend on c 1 as a …xed parameter, we use U (2) ( c 2 ; c 3 j c 1 ) for the general case. For situations where U (2) is independent of c 1 , U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) is used. 
Let c = (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) denote the optimal three period consumption plan for P 1 . Applying terminology from Machina (1989) and McClennen (1990) , the c plan is said to be resolute if and only if the consumer does not modify her (c 2 ; c 3 ) plan even if her tastes change. The naive and sophisticated choice models for solving these two problems, where no assumption is being made about whether or not preferences change, are de…ned as follows.
Definition 2. P 1 and P 2 are said to be solved by naive choice if P 1 is solved for optimal c 1 = c 1 and then optimal c 2 and c 3 are solved via P 2 conditional on c 1 .
Definition 3. P 1 and P 2 are said to be solved by sophisticated choice if P 2 is solved for conditionally optimal c 2 (c 1 ) and c 3 (c 1 ) and then optimal c 1 is determined from solving P 1 conditional on c 2 (c 1 ) and c 3 (c 1 ).
The vectors c = (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) and c = (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) denote respectively the solutions resulting from the naive and sophisticated choice procedures. 16 Given the assumptions on U (1) and U (2) , whereas c will be unique c need not be (see Blackorby, et al., 1973, p. 245) . A time consistent plan is de…ned as follows.
Definition 4. A consumption plan (c 2 ; c 3 ) which optimises P 1 is said to be consistent if and only if (c 2 ; c 3 ) = (c 2 ; c 3 ) for any (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; y 1 ).
Together De…nitions 1 and 4 imply that in a certainty setting, a consumption plan will be consistent if and only if the U (1) and U (2) used to solve P 1 and P 2 are equivalent up to an increasing transform. 15 Although here the investment element of a consumption plan is ignored, in Subsection 6.2 we modify the budget constraints to allow for the investment in one and two period bonds. 16 As pointed out by Peleg and Yaari (1973) , the sophisticated choice process need not always generate an optimal plan. This problem arises when substitution of the P 2 solution into the P 1 optimisation results in U (1) not being concave in c 1 . Consistent with Peleg and Yaari (1973, fn.1) , it follows from Blackorby, et al. (1978) that a su¢ cient condition for a sophisticated solution to exist is that U (2) is homothetic.
Proposition 2. (Blackorby, et al., 1973 ) Assume a consumer confronts choice problems P 1 and P 2 . Then her consumption plan will be consistent if and only if U (1) and
In standard intertemporal choice problems only U (1) is speci…ed and since the continuation of U (1) can be viewed as the period two utility U (2) , tastes do not change.
De…nitions and Motivating Example
Based on the de…nitions in the prior subsection, if the consumption plan is consistent, then c = c .
17
However, it follows from the changing tastes examples in Pollak (1968) and Donaldson and Selden (1981) , where U
(1) and U (2) are log additive but with di¤erent discount functions, that the consistency of a consumption plan is su¢ cient but not necessary for (i) c = c and (ii) the existence of a non-changing tastes utility which rationalises the common plan. 18 Consider the following de…nition. then this common plan is said to be e¤ ectively consistent. Otherwise, the plan is e¤ectively inconsistent.
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The reason for referring to c and c as being e¤ectively consistent is that if a nonchanging tastes b U exists, the agent will never revise her period one plan based on b U in 17 It should be noted that if the consumption plan is consistent, then since U (1) is strictly quasiconcave, it follows from Blackorby, et al. (1973, Theorem 6 ) that c is unique and c = c . 18 Although Pollak (1968) realised the consistency of a consumption plan is not necessary for c = c , he never discussed the existence of a non-changing tastes utility which rationalises the common plan: 19 Given our assumption that U (1) and U (2) are strictly quasiconcave, the naive plan always exists and is unique. The uniqueness of the sophisticated plan follows from the de…nition of e¤ective consistency. If the sophisticated plan is not unique, then the plan is said to be e¤ectively inconsistent. This is analogous to the case of consistent plans where non-uniqueness of sophisticated plans is associated with inconsistency (see Blackorby, et al., 1973, Theorem 6) . 20 Our notion of e¤ectively consistent plans is very di¤erent from Hammond's (1976) (Hammond 1976, p. 171) period two. If the plan is consistent, c and c can be rationalised by U (1) and hence the plan is also e¤ectively consistent. If the plan is inconsistent, one may still be able to rationalise c and c implying that the plan is e¤ectively consistent as illustrated below.
Example 1. Assume the following period one and two utilities
where both satisfy Property 1. Considering naive choice …rst, it follows from the …rst order conditions for problem P 1 that
implying that c 2 and c 3 are nonlinear in income. Solving problem P 2 , one obtains
and
; which are linear in income. Therefore, we have (c 2 ; c 3 ) 6 = (c 2 ; c 3 ) and the consumption plan is inconsistent. Next to apply the sophisticated choice strategy, solve P 2 resulting in the period two conditional demands
and c 3 (c 1 ) =
with respect to c 1 yields
and c 3 =
Thus even though the consumption plan is inconsistent, because c = c it is e¤ectively consistent. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that the common naive and sophisticated demand functions can be rationalised by the following non-changing tastes three period utility function b U (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) = c 1 c 2 + c 3
which satis…es Property 1.
E¤ective Consistency: Su¢ cient Conditions
Building on Example 1, we next derive a general su¢ cient condition for the consumer's plan to be e¤ectively consistent. But …rst note that in the example, optimal c 1 is independent of (p 2 ; p 3 ) which corresponds to the standard notion of a myopic plan (Kurz 1987, p. 579 ).
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Definition 6. Given the pair U (1) ; U (2) and the budget constraint
optimal period one consumption, c 1 ; c 1 or c 1 , is said to be myopic if and only if it is independent of p 2 and p 3 :
The following provides the necessary and su¢ cient restriction on U (1) such that period one consumption is myopic in the sense of De…nition 6.
Proposition 3. (Kannai, et al., 2014) Assume the optimisation problems are de…ned by P 1 and P 2 . Then c 1 (c 1 ) is myopic if and only if U (1) takes the following myopic separable form
where f and g satisfy Property 1 and g > 0.
The utility (6) is referred to as being myopic separable since it is separable in c 1 and results in myopic c 1 -demand. It will be noted that in Example 1, c 1 and c 1 are myopic.
Using this result, the following provides a su¢ cient condition for when a consumption plan will be e¤ectively consistent.
Proposition 4. Given the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , assume
where f (i) (i = 1; 2) and g satisfy Property 1 and g > 0. Then there exists a unique c satisfying, for any (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; y 1 ), c = c , where the common plan is e¤ectively consistent and can be rationalised by
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Several observations should be made relating to the utility functions in Proposition 4. First, it will be noted that in Example 1,
and g (c 1 ) = c 1 . Second, the period two utility (8) depends on period one consumption c 1 implying that in general the marginal rate of substitution between period two and three consumption depends on the consumption history. Third if U
( 1) and U (2) correspond to di¤erent preferences and exhibit changing tastes, the functions
it follows from the proof of the proposition that when solving P 1 , the c 1 -value which maximises the period one utility (7) satis…es
which is independent of the form of f (1) and U (2) and of (p 2 ; p 3 ). Thus consistent with Proposition 3, the consumer can simplify her period one consumption decision by ignoring (p 2 ; p 3 ) and U (2) and just optimising U (1) with regard to c 1 . The resulting c 1 -value corresponds to both optimal naive and sophisticated choice and is optimal with regard to b U . Although in general U (2) in Proposition 4 depends on c 1 , we next consider whether it is possible for U (2) to be independent of c 1 . This can be achieved when f (2) is homogeneous. Assuming f (2) is homogeneous of degree , we have
which is a¢ nely equivalent to f (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ). Before formally stating this result as a corollary, it will prove convenient to introduce the following de…nition.
22 Unless indicated otherwise, proofs are provided in the Appendix to this article.
Definition 7. For any homothetic utility function U , L U is the strictly increasing transformation of U which results in L U U being homogeneous of degree 1.
Corollary 1. Given the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , assume
where f and g satisfy Property 1 and g > 0. If U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) is homothetic, then there exists a unique c satisfying, for any (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; y 1 ), c = c . The common plan is e¤ectively consistent and can be rationalised by
where
and b U satis…es Property 1.
Remark 1. It should be emphasised that U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) in Corollary 1 is assumed to be independent of c 1 . Otherwise, when solving P 2 using sophisticated choice the assumption that U (2) is homothetic in c 2 and c 3 may not ensure that c 2 and c 3 are proportional
Computing the …rst order condition for P 2 and rearranging yields
Substituting this expression into the P 2 budget constraint yields
which is not proportional to y 1 p 1 c 1 since the denominator depends on c 1 . Thus below whenever U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) is homothetic, the utility will be assumed to be independent of c 1 .
The Corollary 1 special case of Proposition 4 where U (2) is assumed to be homothetic is of particular interest given the wide spread use of homotheticity in many economic applications. We next give a necessary condition for e¤ective consistency assuming U (2) is homothetic.
Proposition 5. For the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , if U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) is independent of c 1 and is homothetic, then the sophisticated solution c is unique and can be rationalised by some utility function b U S only if it satis…es for any (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; y 1 ),
23 Similarly, the naive solution c can be rationalised only if c 3 @c 1 =@p 2 = c 2 @c 1 =@p 3 .
Fig. 1. Geometry for Myopic Separable E¤ective Consistency
We can consider two cases satisfying (11). The …rst is where
In this instance since the optimal plan is consistent, the Slutsky symmetry condition is satis…ed implying that (11) holds. (This can be shown using the indirect utility of U (1) and Roy's identity.) The second case where (11) holds is when the sophisticated period one demand is independent of period two and three prices
It follows immediately from Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 that the plan will be e¤ectively consistent if resolute (naive) period one demand is myopic in the sense of De…nition 6 and period two preferences are homothetic. Moreover in this case since u (2) is homogeneous of degree one, eqn. (10) can be written as
implying that the optimal period one consumption solved from b U is also myopic.
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We next discuss the geometric intuition associated with c 1 being myopic using Figure  1 . Assume the conditions in Corollary 1 hold. 25 Consider the two unshaded budget planes characterised by the same y 1 and p 1 ; but di¤erent prices p 2 and p 3 : The budget lines AB and CD are drawn, respectively, on the upper and lower planes. Given that U (1) takes the form of (6), it follows from Proposition 3 that c 1 = c 1 is myopic implying that c 1 is independent of p 2 and p 3 : Thus U (1) determines a vertical shaded plane corresponding to c 1 = c 1 ; which intersects the two budget planes. The period two utility U (2) de…nes a set of indi¤erence curves on the vertical plane. Tangent points 24 It can be easily veri…ed that when U (1) takes the quasilinear form in Proposition 6 below, the optimal naive period one demand is not myopic. 25 The same discussion can also be applied to Proposition 4.
on AB and CD correspond to the naive solutions for the two budget planes.
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On the other hand if the consumer follows sophisticated choice, then on each vertical c 1 plane there exist tangent points on the respective budget lines. Given that c 1 equals c 1 , it also is myopic, and U
(1) determines the same shaded vertical plane corresponding to c 1 = c 1 = c 1 independent of how the budget plane shifts with changing p 2 and p 3 . Given that there exists a b U which rationalises sophisticated (or naive) choice, b U generates the same set of indi¤erence curves as U (2) on each c 1 plane and selects the same c 1 = c 1 = c 1 vertical plane as U (1) .
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Given that the Proposition 4 su¢ cient condition for e¤ective consistency is based on U
(1) and U (2) being myopic separable, is it also the case that myopic separability is necessary? The following, based on a quasilinear U (1) and U (2) , demonstrates that this is not the case.
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Proposition 6. Given the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , assume that
where f (1) , g (1) and g (2) satisfy Property 1. 29 Then there exists a unique c satisfying, for any (p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ; y 1 ), c = c , where the common plan is e¤ectively consistent and can be rationalised by
Remark 2. Blackorby, et al. (1973, Theorem 6, p. 247) state that 'an intertemporal utility function which generates the demand functions of a sophisticated society exists if and only if the society preferences are strongly recursive with a consistent representation'. 30 The su¢ ciency part is not surprising since if preferences are strongly recursive
26 If the plan is consistent, then U (1) generates the same set of indi¤erence curves as U (2) on each budget plane. Otherwise, U (1) produces another set of indi¤erence curves, where the di¤erent tangent points on AB and CD correspond to the resolute solution for the two budget constraints. 27 If as in Proposition 6 below U (1) and U (2) are quasilinear in c 3 , then the optimal c 1 (= c 1 ) does not stay on the same vertical c 1 plane when shifting the budget plane with changing p 2 and p 3 since c 1 (c 1 ) is not myopic. 28 See the online Appendix F for a discussion of normal good behaviour for changing tastes including the myopic separable and quasilinear forms of e¤ectively consistent preferences. 29 It should be noted that it is not necessary for U (1) to be quasilinear in c 3 . If U (2) is quasilinear in c 2 , then the optimal plan is e¤ectively consistent when U (1) is quasilinear in c 2 . 30 A similar assertion can be also found in Blackorby, et al. (1978, Theorem 10.5) , where they introduce additional assumptions but seem to reach essentially the same conclusion.
(i.e., satisfy eqn. (1) in Proposition 1 above) with a consistent representation, then sophisticated choice can be rationalised by a b U = U (1) . On the other hand, the necessity part seems to suggest that when sophisticated choice can be rationalised, preferences must be consistent. But this is contradicted by Propositions 4 and 6 and Example 1.
Remark 3. Although the su¢ cient conditions for e¤ective consistency provided by Propositions 4 and 6 are mutually exclusive, 31 both require period one demand to be rationalisable by at least two di¤erent utility functions. In general this is necessary for the plan to be e¤ectively consistent but not consistent. That is, given U (1) and a (resolute) optimal consumption vector (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ), one needs to …nd another vector (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) with the same period one demand function but di¤erent period two and three demands that is generated by a b U . Since there is total freedom to choose the form of the c 2 demand function (with the optimal c 3 being determined from the budget constraint), one might think that it would not be di¢ cult to …nd such a demand function and utility. However for a b U to exist, the requirement that the Slutsky matrix of the new demand system be symmetric seems quite di¢ cult to satisfy. In Propositions 4 and 6, the period one demand is either independent of both period two and three prices or independent of income and period two prices. This seems to give more freedom to satisfy the Slutsky matrix restriction. It remains an open question whether in the presence of changing tastes, the U (1) forms in Propositions 4 and 6 together are also necessary for the existence of an e¤ectively consistent plan.
Based on the results in this section, it seems natural to conjecture the following although we have not been able to prove it. Conjecture 1. Agreement of the naive and sophisticated solutions is necessary and su¢ cient for (i) the naive plan to be rationalised by b U N and (ii) for the sophisticated plan to be rationalised by b U S . Moreover, the resulting b U N and b U S are ordinally equivalent.
32
31 To see this, note that if U (1) (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) is quasilinear in c 3 as in Proposition 6, it cannot also be myopic separable as assumed in Proposition 4. 32 Donaldson and Selden (1981) prove that if U (1) and U (2) are homothetic and the distribution of income between periods one and two is price and aggregate income independent, then the naive and sophisticated solutions can be generated by b U N and b U S , respectively. They comment in their Remark 3 that this conclusion does not ensure that the naive solution and the sophisticated solution will give the same demand functions. To the contrary, Conjecture 1 states that one can never …nd a b U N that isn't also a b U S and vice versa.
To extend Proposition 6 to the T (> 3) period case, 33 one can simply assume that U (i) (i = 1; 2; :::; T 1) is additively separable and quasilinear in c T . Then the optimal plan is e¤ectively consistent and b U is also quasilinear in c T . The extension of Proposition 4 is more complicated and is provided in the online Appendix G. There we also generalise Propositions 4 and 6 to the case of more than one good in each period.
Revealed Preference Tests
In this section, we derive a revealed preference test for determining whether observed consumption and price data are consistent with the maximisation of e¤ectively consistent preferences as characterised in Proposition 4. (A separate revealed preference test for the quasilinear e¤ectively consistent utility in Proposition 6 and its proof are provided in the online Appendix H.) As Kubler (2004) notes, if only spot demands and prices (and incomes) are observed over time, then in principle one can only obtain a single ("extended") observation unless one uses experimental data.
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To observe sequential choices with the same preferences but di¤erent prices and demands over a T period horizon, one can either (i) assume that the market starts over again after T periods or (ii) conduct laboratory tests where the subjects are asked to choose consumption streams in a set of scenarios characterised by di¤erent prices. In order to discuss the revealed preference test for the e¤ectively consistent form of utility in Proposition 4 (and 6 in the online Appendix H), it will be assumed that N (N > 1) di¤erent data sets are observed and the revealed preference test is performed in an laboratory setting.
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The utilities in both Propositions 4 and 6 should probably be referred to as "semiparametric" rather than non-parameteric as in Varian (1983) . Moreover in our test for the myopic separable form of e¤ective consistency, we must assume g (c 1 ) is concave in order to ensure that the utility (9) is strictly quasiconcave for any concave f function as required by the revealed preference test derived below.
Assume there are N observations of demands and prices (c i ;
and p i 2 R 3 ++ for each i = 1; :::; N . Following the non-parametric approaches of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1983) , we …rst review the standard de…nitions of the revealed preference relations, GARP (generalised axiom of revealed preference) and SARP (strong 33 We assume the natural extension of decision problems P 1 and P 2 to T periods and assume that Property 1 is satis…ed by each period's utility function.
34 Also see Crawford and Polisson (2014) . 35 See Choi, et al. (2007) for an example of the use of laboratory tests to implement revealed preference tests in a static uncertainty setting.
axiom of revealed preference). 
Definition 10. The data (c i ;
The next proposition characterises when observed demand behaviour is consistent with myopic separable e¤ectively consistent preferences. Since the following test is not only a test of whether demand is consistent with maximising the e¤ectively consistent utility b U in Proposition 4, but also the general myopic separable form, we state the result in terms of the general myopic separable utility u given by (12) below. (ii) There exist real numbers (
> 0 such that for all i; j 2 f1; 2; :::; N g 
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It should be emphasised that the revealed preference test provided above can only verify whether a given set of demand data is consistent with maximising our form of e¤ectively consistent utility. The test cannot in general distinguish between the cases where b U rationalises the consumer's demands based on U (1) and U (2) versus the case where her optimal demands are based on b U and she is consistent. 37 However if one reformulates the intertemporal consumption decision problem P 1 as an optimisation problem of allocating initial income among period one consumption and the holdings of zero coupon bonds with one and two period maturities, we show in the online Appendix I that it is possible to distinguish inconsistent naive and consistent choice. Finally, one caveat should be noted on the use of revealed preference tests. Such analyses can only establish that observed demand data is or is not consistent with 36 The Expected Utility test in the recent paper of Kubler, et al. (2014) is also a SARP test. 37 In a quite interesting recent paper, Blow, et al. (2014) derive non-parametric revealed preference tests for the cases of time consistent exponential and time inconsistent quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility (for a formal characterisation of the latter, see Section 5 below). However their approach of formulating the problem as a game among intertemporal selves is di¤erent from the analysis considered in this paper. the maximisation of a utility function with some non-parameteric or semi-parametric property. If the data is inconsistent with a particular form of utility such as the utility in Proposition 7, then one can conclude that the consumer's preferences are not represented by a utility of the hypothesised form. However, one can never tell if the utility function constructed following a revealed preference test really represents the consumer's preferences. This observation has implications for the possibility of using revealed preference tests to prove or disprove Conjecture 1 discussed above in Section 3. Suppose one …nds that price and demand data corresponding to naive choice (or sophisticated choice) satisfy GARP and thus are consistent with maximisation of b U N (or b U S ). This does not imply the existence of b U N (or b U S ) and violation of our conjecture, since adding one more observation might be inconsistent with the existence of the utility.
Quasi-hyperbolic Discounted Utility
In this section, we discuss the implications of e¤ective consistency for the quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility model …rst introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) . Assume the period one utility function takes the following form
where D (t) is the discount function and the ratio D (t) =D (t 1) is the discount factor. 38 The period two utility U (2) exhibits the same discounting pattern
Following Strotz (1956) , the plan is consistent if and only if the discount function is exponential D (t) = t 1 . However, empirical studies suggest that the decision making behaviour of individuals is not compatible with exponential discounted utility, as they tend to overweight the current time period relative to future periods. 39 This has led to the development of quasi-hyperbolic discounted utilities which in the T = 3 case take 38 As is standard, the discount rate t 1 (t > 1) is de…ned by
39 See, for instance, the extensive survey of Frederick, et al. (2002) . the following form
where 0 < ; 1. (The discount function D(t) = 1 if t = 1 and D(t) = t 1 if t > 1 and the discount factor between periods one and two is and between periods two and three ). Clearly eqn. (13) converges to the exponential discounted form when = 1. When 6 = 1, U (2) cannot be nested in U (1) , implying that (13) and (14) exhibit changing tastes. The economic implications of the quasi-hyperbolic discounted form have been studied extensively (Laibson 1997 and Diamond and Koszegi 2003) . The naive and sophisticated plans diverge and in general neither can be rationalised by a utility function. However as illustrated next, when the quasi-hyperbolic naïve and sophisticated plans converge and the common plan is e¤ectively consistent, the common plan is optimal relative to b U .
Example 2. Assume the following period one and two quasi-hyperbolic discounted utilities U (1) (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) = ln c 1 + ln c 2 + 2 ln c 3
and U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) = ln c 2 + ln c 3 ;
where 0 < ; < 1. Given that (15) and (16) exhibit changing tastes, it is straightforward to show that the resolute and naive consumption plans for periods two and three diverge. However since U (1) and U (2) satisfy the conditions in Proposition 4 for a plan to be e¤ectively consistent, naive and sophisticated choice agree. As a result, the common solution can be rationalised by a discounted additive logarithmic b U . To see this, note that applying Corollary 1 g (c 1 ) = c 
Remark 4. The existence of b U in this example seems to present a paradox. On the one hand the representation (17) does not exhibit changing tastes and hence its resulting demands are consistent, but on the other hand the form of the discount function is not exponential. The source of this paradox is the fact that one can either maintain the same pattern of discounting over time or maintain the same absolute discount functions in subsequent time periods.
40 To illustrate this distinction, note that the quasi-hyperbolic utilities U (1) and U (2) , (15) and (16), preserve exactly the same discounting pattern between periods. In this case, the consumer always overweights the current period relative to future periods. Alternatively were the period two utility instead to take the form U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) = ln c 2 + 2 ln c 3 ;
then the same period two and three discount functions would apply for U (1) and U (2) .
Since U (2) would then be nested in U (1) ; the optimal plan would be consistent. However in this case, the consumer only overweights the current period relative to future periods in period one and not in subsequent periods. When there exists a b U , the discount functions carryover from period to period since one can take U implying that the consumer necessarily changes her discounting pattern with the passage of time.
It is demonstrated in the online Appendix J, that if U (1) and U (2) in Example 2 take the more general (non-log) CES (constant elasticity of substitution) quasi-hyperbolic discounted form, although U (2) is homothetic, U (1) does not satisfy the conditions in Corollary 1, c 6 = c and there exists no b U . We next compare the behaviour of discount functions over time corresponding to the quasi-hyperbolic and rationalised b U utility models. But …rst, we generalise the above discussion to T periods (the proof is provided in the online Appendix K).
Proposition 8. Assume in period one the following T period quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility
U
(1) (c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c T ) = ln c 1 +
where 0 < ; < 1 and in each future period utility preserves the same discounting pattern as U where the discount function t for t = 2; :::; T is given by
For the exponential case it follows from (18) that the quasi-hyperbolic discount function for each t = 2; :::; T , will always be smaller than the exponential discount function t 1 so long as < 1.
Eqn. (19) implies that for each period t 2 f2; :::; T g, the b U discount function t will also be less than the exponential discount function. But when t 2, the relationship between t and t 1 is ambiguous in general.
In Figure 2 , we plot the value of the discount functions or discounted value per unit of utility for the exponential, quasi-hyperbolic and b U cases where = 0:95 and = 0:6. The utility b U smooths the discount functions for the quasi-hyperbolic model with the value of the b U discount functions being higher in the earlier years and smaller in the later years. Next consider limit cases. If ! 1, the discount functions for the exponential, quasi-hyperbolic and rationalised discounted utilities all converge to the exponential curve. If ! 1, the value of the discount function for the exponential discounting model would be re ‡ected in Figure 2 by a horizontal line at 1. Moreover, the value of the discount function for the quasi-hyperbolic model would always be except for period one, implying in Figure 2 
Three Changing Tastes Complications
As noted earlier, changing tastes can pose a number of di¢ culties for standard economic analyses. In this section we consider three speci…c complications.
Dutch Book Vulnerability
An individual with intransitive preferences is said to exhibit Dutch Book or money pump behaviour if she can be induced through a sequence of trades to give up her wealth (e.g., Anand 1993) . In a dynamic setting when tastes change since preferences are in general intransitive, the consumer is vulnerable to a Dutch Book. This susceptibility can occur even when the consumer's plan is e¤ectively consistent but not consistent due to the intransitivity of intertemporal preferences. Although the consumer is vulnerable to a sequence of carefully chosen trades, Laibson and Yariv (2007) prove that in a market setting, Dutch Books cannot occur if current and future spot prices are known and …xed and preferences in each period are time separable. Assume there are H consumers, indexed by h = 1; :::; H. For t = 1; 2; 3, let c h;t (c h;t ) denote consumer h 0 s consumption (endowment) in period t, p t the price of consumption in period t and U
( 1) h (c h;1 ; c h;2 ; c h;3 ) and U (2) h (c h;2 ; c h;3 j c h;1 ) the consumer's period one and two utilities. Laibson and Yariv (2007) use the game-theoretic framework and competitive equilibrium approach of Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) and make the following price expectations assumption.
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Assumption 1. Each consumer h has rational price expectations satisfying
where p
(1) j and p (2) j denote, respectively, the price for c h;j in periods one and two. Laibson and Yariv (2007) prove that if each consumer's utilities exhibit changing tastes and take the following time separable forms
ht (c h;t ) and U ht (c h;t ) are continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, and each consumer's price expectations satisfy Assumption 1, then every consumer will follow an intrapersonal equilibrium strategy at each date. And there will exist a sequence of aggregate consumption demands and price vectors that correspond to an intertemporal competitive equilibrium in which Dutch Books do not exist. 42 To show that a Dutch Book can exist in a competitive equilibrium if preferences are not time separable, Laibson and Yariv (2007, Subsection 7 .1) construct an example where (adapted to our setting) a representative agent's utilities are given by
U
(1) (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) = c 3 and U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 j c 1 ) = ln (c 1 + c 2 + c 3 ) + c 2 (0 < < 1) ;
41 As observed by Caplin and Leahy (2006) and Gabrieli and Ghosal (2013) , a sophisticated optimum, when it exists, will also be a subgame perfect equilibrium. 42 An example in Gabrieli and Ghosal (2013) suggests that if one does not assume time separability, then the game-theoretic competitive equilibrium considered in Laibson and Yariv (2007) may not exist.
where the latter utility is not time separable. The agent faces the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , where her budget constraint is
If one solves P 1 and P 2 following sophisticated choice, then exactly the same solution can be obtained as derived by Laibson and Yariv (2007) using the game-theoretic approach. 43 Since it is possible to …nd a set of endowments, a value of and equilibrium prices such that the sophisticated optimum (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) satis…es
it follows that the consumer is vulnerable to a Dutch Book. Since time separability is only a su¢ cient condition for the nonexistence of a Dutch Book in a competitive equilibrium, it is natural to ask whether there are other su¢ cient conditions. Suppose the preferences of each consumer h 2 f1; 2; :::; Hg are e¤ectively consistent where U
(1) h and U (2) h take the form in Propositions 4 or 6. Then consumer h's sophisticated plan can be always rationalised by a strictly quasiconcave b U h . The following proposition proves that a sophisticated equilibrium exists in which p 1 c h;1 + p 2 c h;2 + p 3 c h;3 = p 1 c h;1 + p 2 c h;2 + p 3 c h;3 always holds and no Dutch Book will exist (a formal proof is provided in the online Appendix L).
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Proposition 9. Assume each consumer h 2 f1; 2; :::; Hg in an economy solves the the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , where her utilities U
(1) h and U (2) h take the form in Proposition 4 or 6, and her price expectations satisfy Assumption 1. Then there exists a sophisticated competitive equilibrium in which no Dutch Book exists.
To see the impossibility of a Dutch Book for the e¤ective consistency case, consider the following modi…cation of Example 1.
43 If agents are naive, then in each period t, they will optimise U (t) according to current period prices.
Since U (t) is strictly quasiconcave, we always have
implying that a Dutch Book cannot exist in a naive equilibrium. Therefore, we focus on the sophisticated equilibrium. 44 A sophisticated competitive equilibrium is an equilibrium, where every agent follows sophisticated choice. Refer to De…nition 12 below in a consumption-bond setting.
Example 3. Assume a representative agent with the same period one and two utilities as in Example 1. Suppose that she solves the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , where the P 1 constraint is given by
The period one utility is not time separable but preferences are e¤ectively consistent and b U takes the form given by (5). Then the sophisticated solution (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) is given by (4), where y 1 is replaced by p 1 c 1 + p 2 c 2 + p 3 c 3 . It follows that
and hence there is no Dutch Book in the competitive equilibrium. 
Naive and Sophisticated Equilibria
In economies characterised by changing tastes, di¤erent notions of equilibrium have been developed to accommodate naive versus sophisticated choice behaviour (see Herings and Rohde 2006) . 46 In order to examine the implications of e¤ectively consistent preferences for naive and sophisticated exchange equilibria, we assume the former equilibrium is associated with a naive representative agent and latter with a sophisticated representative agent. To compare the equilibria, it will prove convenient to assume a consumption-bond setup where, without loss of generality, there are three time periods. 47 Let c 1 , b 12 and b 13 denote, respectively, period one consumption, units of a one period bond that pays o¤ one unit of consumption at the beginning of period two and units of a two period bond paying o¤ one unit of consumption at the beginning of period three. The two period bond can be retraded in period two.
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In both periods, consumption is the numeraire. Prices at the beginning of period one for the one 45 Equilibrium prices can be derived from the …rst order conditions associated with maximising b U (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) subject to (20) by assuming c i = c i (i = 1; 2; 3).
46 Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) also discuss the existence of a competitive equilibrium where each agent has time-separable preferences and determines her optimal consumption plan using the gametheoretic approach. However since we, like Herings and Rohde (2006) , consider preferences which are not necessarily time-separable, the equilibrium results in Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) are too restrictive for the case of e¤ective consistency. 47 Kocherlakota (2001) employs a similar setup but di¤ers in introducing a commitment asset and assuming a game-theoretic solution. 48 A naive agent does not anticipate changing her period one plan in period two to re ‡ect her changing tastes and a sophisticated agent will not change her plan because she directly incorporates her changing preferences into the plan. As a result, we assume in this subsection and in the revealed preference and two period bonds are given by, respectively, q 12 and q 13 . In period two, the one period bond matures. Let b 23 and q 23 denote, respectively, the period two units and price of the two period bond with one period of remaining maturity. Let c 1 , b 2 and b 3 denote the representative agent's endowments of period one consumption and zero coupon bonds maturing at the beginning of periods two and three, respectively.
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The individual's optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 , (2) -(3), can be converted into the consumption-bond problems faced by the representative agent where in Q 2 period two income (or wealth) W 2 equals the period two value of bonds b 12 +q 23 b 13 (bought in period one, but valued in period two). This budget constraint for Q 1 is a natural extension of the constraint used in P 1 . The budget constraint implied by P 2 can be written as
where the left hand side is the unconsumed wealth at the end of period one and the right hand side is the present value of future consumption. However this constraint cannot be used for Q 2 , since in the presence of changing tastes the equilibrium price of the two period bond in period two q 23 can diverge from that based on the period one implied forward rate, i.e., q 23 6 = q 13 =q 12 . This requires us instead to use the present value of the bonds in period two based on q 23 in the Q 2 constraint.
Given the optimisation problems Q 1 and Q 2 , the naive and sophisticated representative agents will follow exactly the same solution processes described in De…nitions analysis in online Appendix I that both agents buy a portfolio of short and long term assets in period one such that there is no expectation of having to trade again in period two. This demand behaviour could, for instance, be motivated by the presence of transaction costs associated with trading in bonds. (It is clear that the presence of even the smallest transaction costs will result in both agents seeking to avoid retrading.) Without assuming this demand behaviour, the agent would be indi¤erent to buying di¤erent portfolios of short and long term assets given that prices do not change, resulting in the non-uniqueness of an optimal solution and a failure to have a unique equilibrium. 49 Here we assume that b 2 ; b 3 6 = 0 as in Parlour, et al. (2011). 2 and 3 where optimal demands are based on a partial equilibrium analysis in which equilibrium prices are assumed to be given exogenously and satisfy q 23 = q 13 =q 12 . 50 The presence of bonds does not alter the fact that if preferences are e¤ectively consistent, the consumption plans of the naive and sophisticated agents will satisfy c = c . However as we next argue, the optimal bond demands b 12 and b 13 for the two agents will di¤er if the assumed U (1) and U (2) exhibit changing tastes. This is key in comparing the naive and sophisticated consumption-bond equilibria. The naive representative agent in period one follows resolute choice in determining the bond allocation b 12 = c 2 and
In period two given that the naive agent's tastes have changed, the payo¤s from the one period bond holdings b 12 will in general not match her desired period two optimal consumption c 2 based on U (2) . As a result, she will adjust her resolute two period bond holdings b 13 (which mature at the end of period three) to meet her optimal period two consumption requirements. The naive agent's period three consumption c 3 will always equal her revised two period bond holdings b 23 . In contrast, the sophisticated representative agent anticipates in period one that her tastes will change in period two and chooses her bond holdings to match her desired consumption in period two and three b 12 = c 2 and b 13 = b 23 = c 3 :
The equality b 13 = b 23 follows from the fact that the sophisticated agent does not need to retrade her two period bond holdings. Thus the period one bond allocations (b 12 ; b 13 ) will be di¤erent for the naive and sophisticated representative agents. Moreover given eqn. (22), the e¤ectively consistent b U derived in Section 3 will not only rationalise (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) but also (c 1 ; b 12 ; b 13 ). In contrast for the naive representative agent, it follows from (21) that (c 1 ; b 12 ; b 13 ) can be rationalised by U
(1) rather than b U . Thus the properties of the naive agent's e¤ectively consistent consumption plans such as normal good behaviour cannot directly be translated to her period one bond holdings (b 12 ; b 13 ). This key di¤erence between the agents, results in the divergence between the naive and sophisticated equilibria discussed below.
Next naive and sophisticated equilibria are de…ned following Herings and Rohde (2006) . 50 In the general versus partial equilibrium analysis considered below, we need to take into account the fact that the naive representative agent's assumed equality q 23 = q 13 =q 12 will in general fail to hold in equilibrium. In contrast, the sophisticated agent's assumption that it will hold is substantiated in the sophisticated equilibrium.
Definition 11. An equilibrium (c 1 ; b 12 ; b 13 ; c 2 ; b 23 ; q 12 ; q 13 ; q 23 ) is a naive equilibrium if and only if the equilibrium prices are solved from Q 1 and Q 2 , respectively, by setting the period one resolute demands equal to the endowments c 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 and the period two naive demands equal to b 2 ; b 3 .
Definition 12. An equilibrium (c 1 ; b 12 = c 2 ; b 13 = b 23 = c 3 ; q 12 ; q 13 ; q 23 ) is a sophisticated equilibrium if and only if the equilibrium prices are determined by solving Q 1 and Q 2 and setting the sophisticated demands (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) equal to the endowments c 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 .
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If the plan is e¤ectively consistent, implying the existence of a strictly quasiconcave b U to rationalise the sophisticated representative agent's demands, then it follows from Katzner (1972) that there exists a unique sophisticated equilibrium. Given b U and the exogenous supplies c 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 , the sophisticated equilibrium prices can be computed directly from the …rst order conditions of b U .
The following example illustrates that assuming the naive and sophisticated representative agents'preferences are e¤ectively consistent and their endowments are the same does not imply that the naive and sophisticated equilibria are also the same. Assume endowments are given by c 1 , b 2 and b 3 . Using the …rst order conditions for U (1) and U (2) , naive equilibrium prices satisfy
= q 12 q 23 :
51 Herings and Rohde (2006, p. 600 ) embed a condition analogous to q 12 q 23 = q 13 in their de…nition of a sophisticated equilibrium. 52 The existence of a b U can be of considerable value in studying the properties of a sophisticated equilibrium. As shown in Example M1 in the online Appendix M, although one may not be able to derive an analytic expression for equilibrium prices in terms of endowments and preference parameters by equating demands and endowments, it may be relatively straightforward to do so from the …rst order conditions using b U .
Based on the …rst order condition of b U , sophisticated equilibrium prices satisfy
Thus for the sophisticated equilibrium, q 12 q 23 = q 13 , whereas for the naive equilibrium in general q 12 q 23 and q 13 diverge. The intuition for why the naive and sophisticated equilibria diverge even though the representative agent's consumption plan is e¤ectively consistent can be seen by comparing the naive and sophisticated agents' demands for the one period bond in period two. Although their consumption demands are the same, their consumption plans for periods two and three are di¤erent, which is re ‡ected in their di¤erent one period bond demands 
Aggregation
Assume there are H consumers, indexed by h = 1; :::; H. For t = 1; 2; 3, let c h;t (c h;t ) denote consumer h's consumption (endowment) in period t. To simplify the notation, c t will be used instead of c A;t to denote aggregate demands. Let U
h (c h;1 ; c h;2 ; c h;3 ) and U (2) h (c h;2 ; c h;3 j c h;1 ) be the consumer's period one and period two utilities. The budget constraint for agent h is given by p 1 c h;1 + p 2 c h;2 + p 3 c h;3 = y h;1 p 1 c h;1 + p 2 c h;2 + p 3 c h;3 ;
where y h;1 denotes the period one income (wealth) of consumer h. As is standard in the aggregation literature, we will make use of the following restriction on endowments.
Definition 13. The endowments fc h ; :::c H g in an economy are said to be collinear if and only if they satisfy c h = ! h c 8h 2 f1; 2; :::; Hg ;
where P H h=1 ! h = 1 and c = P H h=1 c h .
Given (23), collinearity of endowments is equivalent to consumer incomes being proportional. It follows from Chipman (1974) that if each consumer has preferences which do not change over time, are homothetic and are representable by a U h satisfying Property 1 and endowments are collinear, then there exists an aggregator U A which satis…es Property 1 and rationalises the aggregate demand of the H consumers. When considering an economy of consumers with changing tastes, each consumer is characterised by the pair of utilities U
( 1) h (c h;1 ; c h;2 ; c h;3 ) and U (2) h (c h;2 ; c h;3 j c h;1 ). Then given aggregate naive or sophisticated demands, does a non-changing tastes U A exist which generates the sum of the demands for the naive or sophisticated consumers (where the U A may be di¤erent for the two cases)?
We next provide a su¢ cient condition such that the naive and sophisticated demands generated by an economy of e¤ectively consistent agents with changing tastes can be rationalised by a common aggregator utility denoted b U A (the proof is provided in the online Appendix N). The resulting aggregate demands satisfy P H h=1 c h = P H h=1 c h and the aggregator inherits the e¤ectively consistent form of utility of the set of individual consumer utilities f b U 1 ; :::; b U h ; :::; b U H g.
Proposition 10. In a three period heterogeneous exchange economy with H agents, the utilities of agent h 2 f1; 2; :::; Hg are given by
h (c h;1 ; c h;2 ; c h;
h (c h;2 ; c h;3 ) is homothetic and both U
h (c h;1 ; c h;2 ; c h;3 ) and U
h (c h;2 ; c h;3 ) satisfy Property 1.
53 If the endowments are collinear, i.e., eqn. (24) is satis…ed, then the aggregate demands can be rationalised by the e¤ectively consistent aggregator
where b U A (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) satis…es Property 1, u
A (c 2 ; c 3 ) is homogeneous of degree 1 and
Remark 5. It should be noted that although the aggregate demands based on naive and sophisticated choice can be rationalised by a utility function if the conditions in Proposition 10 are satis…ed, since U
( 1) h (c h;1 ; c h;2 ; c h;3 ) need not be homothetic, there may not exist an aggregator for aggregate resolute demands.
53 It follows from the Corollary 1 that g h (c h;1 ) being a power function implies that, for each agent h, there exists a b U h which is homothetic.
Given the speci…c form of the period one utility (25) - (26) 
corresponds to period one income for agent h. Combining eqns. (28) and (29) and solving for b h yields
implying that b h is the ratio of the expenditure on period one consumption to the expenditure on period two and three consumption. The process for …nding the aggregator b U A corresponding to (25) - (26) in Proposition 10 is illustrated by the following example (supporting calculations are provided in the online Appendix O). and U
2 (c 2;2 ; c 2;3 ) = ln c 2;2 + ln c 2;3 b U 2 (c 2;1 ; c 2;2 ; c 2;3 ) = c 2;1 p c 2;2 c 2;3 :
The utilities U
h , h = 1; 2, take the form required by Proposition 10, where g h (c h;1 ) = c b h h;1 and b 1 = 1=2 and b 2 = 1. Each consumer h considers the optimisation problems P 1 and P 2 with the modi…ed budget constraint (23). Assume the special form of proportional endowments, c 1 = c 2 . To construct b U A using eqn. (27) in Proposition 10, it is …rst necessary to derive u ; where p = p 2 =p 3 and m = 7 (p 1 c 1 + p 2 c 2 + p 3 c 3 ) = (12p 3 ) are the normalised price and income, respectively. Second, the direct utility function u Thus the aggregate demands can be obtained by maximising the aggregator (30) subject to the aggregate version of the budget constraint (23).
For the case of heterogeneous quasilinear e¤ectively consistent consumers, a similar aggregation result holds except that no restriction is required on the distribution of initial endowments. (See the online Appendix P.)
Concluding Comments
In this paper assuming changing tastes, we provide two di¤erent restrictions on preferences which are su¢ cient for plans to be e¤ectively consistent. Revealed preference tests for the utility forms associated with e¤ective consistency are derived and the changing tastes complications associated with Dutch Books, naive and sophisticated equilibria and aggregation are investigated. A number of open questions remain. First, are there other forms of utility beyond those speci…ed in Propositions 4 and 6 which result in e¤ectively consistent plans? Second, is our conjecture correct that naive and sophisticated choices must agree when either optimal plan can be rationalised? Third, is it possible to derive other conditions for aggregation when consumers exhibit changing tastes? Fourth, does the notion of e¤ective consistency extend to uncertainty settings and how is this related to the literature on inconsistency associated with various forms of non-Expected Utility preferences?
A. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider naive choice. De…ne x = g (c 1 ) c 2 and y = g (c 1 ) c 3 . The …rst order conditions are given by g (c 1 ) f 
C. Proof of Proposition 5
First since we assume that U (2) is homothetic, it follows from Blackorby, et al. (1973, Theorem 5 ) that sophisticated choice is unique. To simplify notation in this proof, (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) is used instead of (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) to denote the optimal demands from sophisticated choice. Since U (2) (c 2 ; c 3 ) is homothetic, following sophisticated choice results in c 2 = 2 (y 1 p 1 c 1 ) and c 3 = 3 (y 1 p 1 c 1 ), where 2 > 0 and 3 > 0 are functions of (p 2 ; p 3 ). Given that p 2 c 2 + p 3 c 3 = (p 2 2 + p 3 3 ) (y 1 p 1 c 1 ) = y 1 p 1 c 1 , it follows that p 2 2 + p 3 3 = 1:
Combining this equation with (C.3) yields 3 @c 1 =@p 2 = 2 @c 1 =@p 3 , or equivalently c 3 @c 1 =@p 2 = c 2 @c 1 =@p 3 .
D. Proof of Proposition 6
For naive choice, it can be veri…ed that @f (1) =@c 1 = p 1 =p 3 and @g (2) =@c 2 = p 2 =p 3 , which will be recognised to be the …rst order conditions associated with maximising b U (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) = f (1) (c 1 ) + g (2) (c 2 ) + c 3 . This implies that naive choice agrees with the optimal demands for b U . For sophisticated choice, it follows from the …rst order condition associated with maximising U (2) that @g (2) =@c 2 = p 2 =p 3 , implying that c 2 is independent of c 1 and y 1 . Therefore conditional on the optimal c 1 , one must have and thus sophisticated choice also agrees with the optimal demands for b U . Since U
= @U
and U (2) satisfy Property 1, clearly b U also satis…es Property 1. Thus maximising b U has a unique solution implying that optimal sophisticated demands are also unique.
E. Proof of Proposition 7
To see that (i) implies (ii), …rst compute the …rst order conditions
